Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting
zbMATH Open document ID: 1186.91131
author: Fahad Khalil
author: David Martimort
author: Bruno M. Parigi
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2007-09-14T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: martimort khalil parigi.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
zbMATH DE Number: 5190994
zbMATH Keywords: Monitoring
zbMATH Keywords: common agency
zbMATH Keywords: costly state verification
Wikidata QID: Q61068312
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3123594775
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DBLP publication ID: journals/jet/KhalilMP07
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2005.08.010
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5190994