Equilibrium in the two-player, \(k\)-double auction with affiliated private values
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Equilibrium in the two-player, \(k\)-double auction with affiliated private values
zbMATH Open document ID: 1186.91109
author: Ohad Kadan
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2007-09-14T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 5191015
zbMATH Keywords: affiliation
zbMATH Keywords: double auction
zbMATH Keywords: increasing strategies
zbMATH Keywords: private values
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2006.06.004
OpenAlex ID: W3122787642
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2006.06.004
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5191015