Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1283.91058
author: Stefan Maus
author: Ton Storcken
author: Hans Peters
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2007-07-23T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 5173627
zbMATH Keywords: social choice functions
zbMATH Keywords: minimal manipulability
zbMATH Keywords: anonymity
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.mathsocsci.2007.02.002
OpenAlex ID: W2084564739
cites work: Q4495209
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cites work: Interjacency
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DOI: 10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2007.02.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5173627