Pages that link to "Item:Q1077313"

The following pages link to The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem (Q1077313):

Displaying 44 items.

• Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties (Q2334139) (← links)
• Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems (Q2343805) (← links)
• Ranking sets of interacting objects via semivalues (Q2355016) (← links)
• Incentives in landing slot problems (Q2359379) (← links)
• The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer-seller markets when the agents play strategically (Q2363424) (← links)
• One-to-many non-cooperative matching games (Q2376068) (← links)
• The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets (Q2376989) (← links)
• Efficient and incentive compatible exchange of real-time information (Q2424242) (← links)
• Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets (Q2431838) (← links)
• Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets (Q2431839) (← links)
• Nash implementation via hyperfunctions (Q2432512) (← links)
• Absorbing sets in roommate problems (Q2436304) (← links)
• Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets (Q2437176) (← links)
• Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand (Q2437801) (← links)
• Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare (Q2437848) (← links)
• An incompatibility between recursive unanimity and strategy-proofness in two-sided matching problems (Q2452262) (← links)
• Fair and efficient student placement with couples (Q2458423) (← links)
• Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism (Q2467483) (← links)
• Random matching in the college admissions problem (Q2472434) (← links)
• Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration (Q2482665) (← links)
• The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules (Q2482680) (← links)
• Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions (Q2482681) (← links)
• Median stable matching for college admissions (Q2491093) (← links)
• Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems (Q2496782) (← links)
• College admissions with affirmative action (Q2576650) (← links)
• Cycles to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings (Q2673686) (← links)
• The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings (Q2675448) (← links)
• The two-sided matching problem. Origin, development and current issues (Q2772855) (← links)
• Strong and Weak Acyclicity in Iterative Voting (Q2819458) (← links)
• Matching with couples: a multidisciplinary survey (Q2854007) (← links)
• The College Admissions Problem Revisited (Q3821889) (← links)
• Stability Representations of Many-to-One Matching Problems: An Integer Optimization Approach (Q5060805) (← links)
• Two-Sided Matching Models (Q5150290) (← links)
• Market Design (Q5150291) (← links)
• Stable Matching in Large Economies (Q5225243) (← links)
• Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities (Q5247606) (← links)
• Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents (Q6076915) (← links)
• Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence (Q6077637) (← links)
• Sufficient conditions making lexicographic rules over the power set satisfy extensibility (Q6167806) (← links)
• The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice (Q6176756) (← links)
• Large random matching markets with localized preference structures can exhibit large cores (Q6494253) (← links)
• Dorm augmented college assignments (Q6570727) (← links)
• A perfectly robust approach to multiperiod matching problems (Q6664580) (← links)
• Strategy-proof interval-social choice correspondences over extended single-peaked domains (Q6665444) (← links)