Pages that link to "Item:Q1079121"

The following pages link to Some remarks on the stable matching problem (Q1079121):

Displaying 50 items.

• Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets (Q2431839) (← links)
• Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets (Q2437176) (← links)
• Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare (Q2437848) (← links)
• Vacancies in supply chain networks (Q2439809) (← links)
• Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria (Q2453419) (← links)
• Stable schedule matchings (Q2454577) (← links)
• Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism (Q2467483) (← links)
• Welfare and stability in senior matching markets (Q2482669) (← links)
• The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems (Q2482674) (← links)
• The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules (Q2482680) (← links)
• The two-sided matching problem. Origin, development and current issues (Q2772855) (← links)
• Applications of game theory to economics (Q2852561) (← links)
• A Generalized Polymatroid Approach to Stable Matchings with Lower Quotas (Q2976150) (← links)
• Stable Marriage and Roommates Problems with Restricted Edges: Complexity and Approximability (Q3449578) (← links)
• Size Versus Stability in the Marriage Problem (Q3602826) (← links)
• Bargaining and Competition in Matching Markets (Q3748090) (← links)
• Stable matchings and stable partitions^∗ (Q3989849) (← links)
• Solving stable matching problems using answer set programming (Q4593026) (← links)
• The Maximum-Weight Stable Matching Problem: Duality and Efficiency (Q4899065) (← links)
• An efficient implementation of the Gale and Shapley “propose-and-reject” algorithm (Q4957968) (← links)
• Popularity, Mixed Matchings, and Self-Duality (Q5000640) (← links)
• Strongly Stable and Maximum Weakly Stable Noncrossing Matchings (Q5041200) (← links)
• On Treewidth and Stable Marriage: Parameterized Algorithms and Hardness Results (Complete Characterization) (Q5062116) (← links)
• Quasi-Popular Matchings, Optimality, and Extended Formulations (Q5076707) (← links)
• Pairwise Preferences in the Stable Marriage Problem (Q5090469) (← links)
• Jointly stable matchings (Q5136277) (← links)
• (Q5136288) (← links)
• (Q5136309) (← links)
• Popular Matchings with Lower Quotas (Q5136336) (← links)
• Two-Sided Matching Models (Q5150290) (← links)
• On Likely Solutions of the Stable Matching Problem with Unequal Numbers of Men and Women (Q5219711) (← links)
• Algorithmic Aspects of Equilibria of Stable Marriage Model with Complete Preference Lists (Q5232794) (← links)
• (Q5743383) (← links)
• New and simple algorithms for stable flow problems (Q5915793) (← links)
• Balanced stable marriage: how close is close enough? (Q5918373) (← links)
• Maximum stable matching with one-sided ties of bounded length (Q5918705) (← links)
• Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible (Q5964686) (← links)
• Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems (Q6039790) (← links)
• Dynamically stable matching (Q6059528) (← links)
• Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core (Q6063093) (← links)
• Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents (Q6076915) (← links)
• Incomplete list setting of the hospitals/residents problem with maximally satisfying lower quotas (Q6109545) (← links)
• An étude in modeling the definability of equilibrium (Q6156318) (← links)
• A unified approach to strategy-proofness of the deferred-acceptance rule and the top-trading cycles rule (Q6156333) (← links)
• Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems (Q6188681) (← links)
• Refined computational complexities of hospitals/residents problem with regional caps (Q6201324) (← links)
• Maximum matchings and popularity (Q6490278) (← links)
• Stable matchings, one-sided ties, and approximate popularity (Q6547210) (← links)
• Verification protocol for stable matching from conditional disclosure of secrets (Q6547974) (← links)
• A characterization of stable mechanisms that minimize manipulation (Q6594331) (← links)