Pages that link to "Item:Q2491032"

The following pages link to On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems (Q2491032):

Displaying 22 items.

• Prioritization method for frontier DMUs: A slack-based measure (Q2490219) (← links)
• Efficient priority rules (Q2506315) (← links)
• A necessary and sufficient condition for stable matching rules to be strategy-proof (Q2513288) (← links)
• Beyond the worst-case analysis of random priority: smoothed and average-case approximation ratios in mechanism design (Q2672280) (← links)
• Optimal priority assignment with hard constraint (Q3028695) (← links)
• Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms (Q3057835) (← links)
• Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory (Q4586048) (← links)
• Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities (Q4612461) (← links)
• Priority Rules and Other Asymmetric Rationing Methods (Q4799857) (← links)
• Allocation with Weak Priorities and General Constraints (Q5058045) (← links)
• Two-Sided Matching Models (Q5150290) (← links)
• (Q5314902) (← links)
• When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? (Q6063102) (← links)
• New axioms for top trading cycles (Q6066263) (← links)
• Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms (Q6074836) (← links)
• Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf (Q6121908) (← links)
• Unique stable matchings (Q6176757) (← links)
• Fairness and efficiency of the random serial dictatorship on preference domains with a tier structure (Q6556194) (← links)
• The core of school choice problems (Q6559104) (← links)
• A characterization of the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice problem (Q6575517) (← links)
• Capacity design in school choice (Q6584598) (← links)
• Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: when is there a trade-off? (Q6665669) (← links)