Pages that link to "Item:Q1283855"

The following pages link to A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement (Q1283855):

Displaying 30 items.

• Optimization-based Mechanisms for the Course Allocation Problem (Q3386789) (← links)
• Minimum Maximal Matching Is NP-Hard in Regular Bipartite Graphs (Q3502661) (← links)
• Student Portfolios and the College Admissions Problem (Q4610673) (← links)
• (Q5053286) (← links)
• Two-Sided Matching Models (Q5150290) (← links)
• Stable Matching in Large Economies (Q5225243) (← links)
• Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities (Q5247606) (← links)
• New and simple algorithms for stable flow problems (Q5915793) (← links)
• Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible (Q5964686) (← links)
• Cutoff stability under distributional constraints with an application to summer internship matching (Q6120933) (← links)
• Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf (Q6121908) (← links)
• The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts (Q6145086) (← links)
• School choice with transferable student characteristics (Q6148575) (← links)
• Top trading cycles with reordering: improving match priority in school choice (Q6168800) (← links)
• Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems (Q6188681) (← links)
• Reallocation with priorities (Q6188682) (← links)
• Preference submission timing and college admission outcomes: evidence from Turkey (Q6541997) (← links)
• Computational complexity of \(k\)-stable matchings (Q6546302) (← links)
• Modifications of Boston, Taiwanese and Chinese mechanisms are not comparable via counting manipulating students (Q6549826) (← links)
• The core of school choice problems (Q6559104) (← links)
• Top trading cycles (Q6559462) (← links)
• On the efficiency and fairness of deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking (Q6564052) (← links)
• Efficient matching under general constraints (Q6565039) (← links)
• Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent (Q6565778) (← links)
• Robustness to manipulations in school choice (Q6570723) (← links)
• A characterization of the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice problem (Q6575517) (← links)
• Capacity design in school choice (Q6584598) (← links)
• Partitionable choice functions and stability (Q6624514) (← links)
• Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: when is there a trade-off? (Q6665669) (← links)
• Stability vs. no justified envy (Q6665684) (← links)