Pages that link to "Item:Q1082352"

The following pages link to A further note on the stable matching problem (Q1082352):

Displaying 27 items.

• Quasi stable outcomes in the assignment game (Q430896) (← links)
• The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching model (Q617603) (← links)
• Marriage matching and gender satisfaction (Q733764) (← links)
• Corrigendum to ``stable matchings and preferences of couples'' (Q840696) (← links)
• Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money (Q896943) (← links)
• On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory (Q908176) (← links)
• Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (Q908186) (← links)
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem (Q1079121) (← links)
• Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets (Q1371137) (← links)
• Perfect matching interdiction problem restricted to a stable vertex (Q1794725) (← links)
• Sisterhood in the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm (Q1953489) (← links)
• Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets (Q2021788) (← links)
• Two-sided matching markets with strongly correlated preferences (Q2140473) (← links)
• Matching of like rank and the size of the core in the marriage problem (Q2345222) (← links)
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems (Q2373788) (← links)
• Welfare and stability in senior matching markets (Q2482669) (← links)
• Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions (Q2482681) (← links)
• A necessary and sufficient condition for stable matching rules to be strategy-proof (Q2513288) (← links)
• von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching (Q3095018) (← links)
• Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition (Q4682746) (← links)
• The Maximum-Weight Stable Matching Problem: Duality and Efficiency (Q4899065) (← links)
• Strategic Issues in One-to-One Matching with Externalities (Q5013394) (← links)
• Two-Sided Matching Models (Q5150290) (← links)
• On Likely Solutions of the Stable Matching Problem with Unequal Numbers of Men and Women (Q5219711) (← links)
• Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems (Q6039790) (← links)
• Unique stable matchings (Q6176757) (← links)
• A characterization of stable mechanisms that minimize manipulation (Q6594331) (← links)