Pages that link to "Item:Q1119144"
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The following pages link to Veto theorems with expansion consistency conditions and without the weak Pareto principle (Q1119144):
Displaying 15 items.
- Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization (Q404767) (← links)
- Weak independent decisiveness and the existence of a unique vetoer (Q500589) (← links)
- Social choice theory without Pareto: the pivotal voter approach (Q732930) (← links)
- On the frontier between possibility and impossibility theorems in social choice (Q788597) (← links)
- Power structure and cardinality restrictions for Paretian social choice rules (Q800196) (← links)
- Intergenerational social choice without the Pareto principle (Q918349) (← links)
- Consistent social choice functions and systems of distinct representatives (Q1062886) (← links)
- Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions (Q1066782) (← links)
- Weak independence and veto power. (Q1606284) (← links)
- Voting procedures in the space of choice functions: Non-monotonic case (Q1913836) (← links)
- Uniformly bounded sufficient sets and quasitransitive social choice (Q1938944) (← links)
- A note on Murakami's theorems and incomplete social choice without the Pareto principle (Q2217361) (← links)
- Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship (Q2628710) (← links)
- Collective choice rules with social maximality (Q2668991) (← links)
- Social choice and individual values (Q2783476) (← links)