Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions (Q1066782)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3926579
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3926579 |
Statements
Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions (English)
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1985
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Let X be a finite set of social states (at least four), and N a finite set of voters (at least two). Let C be a social choice function satisfying the independence condition and Pareto optimality. C satisfies strong dominance if C(B)\(\subseteq C(A)\cap B\), where A and B are subsets of X, and B contains exactly two elements. The main result is that such a strongly dominant C has a dictator.
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independence condition
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Pareto optimality
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strong dominance
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dictator
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