The following pages link to Hitoshi Matsushima (Q192165):
Displaying 33 items.
- Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information (Q617676) (← links)
- Dominant strategy mechanisms with mutually payoff-relevant private information and with public information (Q751947) (← links)
- Contractual delay and efficiency in delegation games. Two-principal case (Q757261) (← links)
- On the theory of repeated games with private information. I: Anti-folk theorem without communication (Q810388) (← links)
- On the theory of repeated games with private information. II: Revelation through communication (Q810389) (← links)
- Long-term partnership in a repeated prisoner's dilemma with random matching (Q922305) (← links)
- Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies (Q938058) (← links)
- A new approach to the implementation problem (Q1101317) (← links)
- Efficiency in repeated games with imperfect monitoring (Q1122518) (← links)
- Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability (Q1178820) (← links)
- Efficiency in partnerships (Q1181667) (← links)
- Coalitionally dominant strategy mechanisms with limited public information (Q1189350) (← links)
- Exact implementation (Q1339736) (← links)
- Bayesian monotonicity with side payments (Q1804017) (← links)
- Behavioral aspects of implementation theory (Q1934850) (← links)
- Behavioral aspects of arbitrageurs in timing games of bubbles and crashes (Q1945851) (← links)
- Connected price dynamics with revealed preferences and Auctioneer's discretion in VCG combinatorial auction (Q2098923) (← links)
- Efficient combinatorial allocations: individual rationality versus stability (Q2098976) (← links)
- Timing games with irrational types: leverage-driven bubbles and crash-contingent claims (Q2099022) (← links)
- Behavioral theory of repeated prisoner's dilemma: generous tit-for-tat strategy (Q2099044) (← links)
- Epistemological implementation of social choice functions (Q2100648) (← links)
- Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: experiments (Q2178016) (← links)
- Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions (Q2235090) (← links)
- Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability (Q2296029) (← links)
- Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance (Q2370489) (← links)
- Process manipulation in unique implementation (Q2453402) (← links)
- Role of honesty in full implementation (Q2475185) (← links)
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information (Q4016221) (← links)
- Private Observation, Communication and Collusion (Q4530916) (← links)
- Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players (Q5475034) (← links)
- Multimarket contact, imperfect monitoring, and implicit collusion (Q5938637) (← links)
- Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments (Q6100484) (← links)
- Two experiments on trading information goods in a network (Q6565025) (← links)
