On the theory of repeated games with private information. I: Anti-folk theorem without communication (Q810388)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4213777
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | On the theory of repeated games with private information. I: Anti-folk theorem without communication |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4213777 |
Statements
On the theory of repeated games with private information. I: Anti-folk theorem without communication (English)
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1991
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We consider repeated games with private information and with discounting. We present an example in which the repetition of the one-shot equilibrium is the only reasonable pure strategy supergame equilibrium, where each player may almost perfectly monitor the other players' choices. This implies that if players' private signals are not correlated, it may be difficult to sustain collusion as an equilibrium.
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repeated games with private information
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discounting
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