Pages that link to "Item:Q1423684"
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The following pages link to Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism (Q1423684):
Displaying 19 items.
- Matching in marriage and markets (Q389880) (← links)
- Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets (Q485820) (← links)
- A further note on the college admission game (Q662278) (← links)
- Constrained school choice (Q840677) (← links)
- A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search (Q893408) (← links)
- On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory (Q908176) (← links)
- Co-ranking mates: assortative matching in marriage markets (Q969493) (← links)
- Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability (Q1021616) (← links)
- Implementation in the many-to-many matching market. (Q1420524) (← links)
- On the stability of couples (Q1630461) (← links)
- Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching (Q1651221) (← links)
- Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: equilibria versus stability (Q2013343) (← links)
- Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria (Q2453419) (← links)
- The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules (Q2482680) (← links)
- Matching with couples: a multidisciplinary survey (Q2854007) (← links)
- Implementation of the core in college admissions problems when colleagues matter (Q2867466) (← links)
- The Collective Marriage Matching Model: Identification, Estimation, and Testing (Q5133538) (← links)
- Two-Sided Matching Models (Q5150290) (← links)
- Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets (Q6107369) (← links)
