Pages that link to "Item:Q1577962"

The following pages link to Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems (Q1577962):

Displaying 35 items.

• Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets (Q485820) (← links)
• Decentralized job matching (Q532508) (← links)
• Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games (Q548065) (← links)
• In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm (Q705854) (← links)
• Decentralized college admissions under single application (Q826044) (← links)
• A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search (Q893408) (← links)
• Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems (Q930486) (← links)
• The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP) (Q972135) (← links)
• Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability (Q1021616) (← links)
• Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations (Q1276120) (← links)
• The role of unions in hiring procedures for job markets (Q1285523) (← links)
• Implementation of college admission rules (Q1357430) (← links)
• Implementation in the many-to-many matching market. (Q1420524) (← links)
• Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism (Q1423684) (← links)
• A simple selling and buying procedure (Q1601457) (← links)
• Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching (Q1651221) (← links)
• Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints (Q1677256) (← links)
• Strategic issues in college admissions with score-limits (Q1728163) (← links)
• Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem (Q1927736) (← links)
• Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: equilibria versus stability (Q2013343) (← links)
• Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium (Q2031196) (← links)
• Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm (Q2041080) (← links)
• Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab (Q2067353) (← links)
• College admissions with ties and common quotas: integer programming approach (Q2077946) (← links)
• Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets (Q2431839) (← links)
• Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria (Q2453419) (← links)
• The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules (Q2482680) (← links)
• Decentralized matching: the role of commitment (Q2516226) (← links)
• The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism (Q2675461) (← links)
• Implementation of the core in college admissions problems when colleagues matter (Q2867466) (← links)
• The College Admissions Problem Revisited (Q3821889) (← links)
• (Q5053286) (← links)
• Two-Sided Matching Models (Q5150290) (← links)
• Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets (Q6107369) (← links)
• Sequential school choice with public and private schools (Q6624508) (← links)