Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions (Q1095771)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4029218
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4029218 |
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Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions (English)
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1987
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This paper characterizes neutral social functions that are fully implementable. A neutral social function must be monotonic and simple to be fully implementable under either the Nash equilibrium concept or the strong Nash equilibrium concept. If a neutral social function is monotonic and simple, then the social function is fully implementable by a set of Nash equilibria. For finite alternative sets a neutral social function will be fully implementable by a set of strong Nash equilibria if and only if it is monotonic, simple and dictatorial.
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full Nash implementation
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neutral social functions
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strong Nash equilibrium
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0.8951056
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0.8848617
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0.8795996
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0.87280303
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