A re-evaluation of perfect competition as the solution to the Bertrand price game (Q1262189)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4123474
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | A re-evaluation of perfect competition as the solution to the Bertrand price game |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4123474 |
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A re-evaluation of perfect competition as the solution to the Bertrand price game (English)
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1989
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A price setting game is considered. The set of mixed strategy Nash equilibria are such that at least two players choose marginal cost with probability one. In a special case where only finitely many prices are feasible, there is a unique Nash equilibrium with the property that the strategies are not weakly dominated. Here each player chooses the smallest price greater than marginal cost.
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Bertrand equilibrium
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price setting game
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mixed strategy Nash equilibria
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0.8759017
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0.8721629
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0.86920077
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0.86910814
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0.86219627
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