Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment (Q1308807)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 465076
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 465076 |
Statements
Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment (English)
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10 December 1993
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Bilateral (sequential) negotiators delay agreements until a deadline if a player that rejects an offer is subsequently committed not to accept any poorer proposal, and if the common discount factor is close enough to one.
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bargaining
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endogenous commitment
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