Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining. (Q1408706)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1985830
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining. |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1985830 |
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Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining. (English)
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25 September 2003
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In this research work the authors endogenize departures from rationality on the foundations of the processes concerning the evolutionary selections, using for appropriate interpretations some adequate kinds of probabilities, in the environments with unobservable players types. The paper contains important results in this field of knowledge, with significant arguments, pertinent computational proofs and appropriate selective references.
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evolutionary stability
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bargaining
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reputational model
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