A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule (Q1411093)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1993497
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1993497 |
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A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule (English)
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16 October 2003
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The authors identify two large domains of profiles on which the majority rule is strategy-proof and is the only non-dictatorial social choice rule that is strategy-proof. In one case, the domain is the set of profiles of linear orderings for which a strong Condorcet winner exists, and, in the other case the domain is the set of profiles of complete and asymmetric binary relations for which a strong Condorcet winner exists.
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strategy-proofness
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majority rule
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