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Auction design with heterogeneous priors - MaRDI portal

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Auction design with heterogeneous priors (Q6565054)

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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7874130
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Auction design with heterogeneous priors
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7874130

    Statements

    title
    Auction design with heterogeneous priors (English)
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    author
    Hien Pham
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    Takuro Yamashita
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    publication date
    1 July 2024
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    review text
    In this article, the authors consider the private-value auction setting where the true distribution of bidders' valuations is unknown. The seller and each bidder, however, know its approximation. In this framework, it is shown that the dominant-strategy mechanism secures the seller with the highest revenue guarantee. Besides, if the seller is restricted to using a dominant-strategy mechanism, we have characterized the transfer reducing mechanism that helps the seller to obtain a vanishing loss as the estimates by her and the bidders get close to the truth.
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    zbMATH Keywords
    robust mechanism design
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    worst case guarantee
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    heterogeneous prior
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    auction
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    foundation for dominant-strategy mechanisms
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    Identifiers

    zbMATH DE Number
    7874130
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