Auction design with heterogeneous priors

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.04.002zbMATH Open1544.91156MaRDI QIDQ6565054

Hien Pham, Takuro Yamashita

Publication date: 1 July 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

auctionrobust mechanism designworst case guaranteefoundation for dominant-strategy mechanismsheterogeneous prior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Robust monopoly pricing
• Locally robust implementation and its limits
• Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms
• Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction
• The Limits of ex post Implementation
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Sellers with Misspecified Models
• Robustness and Separation in Multidimensional Screening
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms

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