Endogenous Agency Problems and the Dynamics of Rents

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDAA021zbMATH Open1471.91239OpenAlexW3123257042MaRDI QIDQ3382409

Augustin Landier, Bruno Biais

Publication date: 21 September 2021

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaa021

zbMATH Keywords

complexitymoral hazarddynamic contractsagency rents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

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