Noncooperative management of the Northeast Atlantic cod fishery: a first mover advantage

DOI10.1111/NRM.12040zbMATH Open1542.91166MaRDI QIDQ6550408

Marko Lindroos, Trond Bjørndal

Publication date: 5 June 2024

Published in: Natural Resource Modeling (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

first movernon-cooperative managementNortheast Atlantic cod

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The management of high seas fisheries
• OPTIMAL RECOVERY OF A SHARED RESOURCE STOCK: A DIFFERENTIAL GAME MODEL WITH EFFICIENT MEMORY EQUILIBRIA
• SHARING THE NORTHEAST ARCTIC COD: POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
• THE CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF HIGH SEAS FISHERY RESOURCES UNDER THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA
• GAME‐THEORETIC INSIGHTS INTO THE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF FISHERIES
• A COALITION APPROACH TO THE MANAGEMENT OF HIGH SEAS FISHERIES IN THE PRESENCE OF EXTERNALITIES
• WHEN TO RATIFY AN ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENT: THE CASE OF HIGH SEAS FISHERIES

This page was built for publication: Noncooperative management of the Northeast Atlantic cod fishery: a first mover advantage

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6550408)