Pure Nash equilibriums and independent dominating sets in evolutionary games on networks

DOI10.3934/JDG.2023027zbMATH Open1545.91056MaRDI QIDQ6569377

C. Mocenni, Jean Carlo Moraes

Publication date: 9 July 2024

Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theorypure Nash equilibriumindependent dominating setsreplicator equation on networked populations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving graphs (91A43) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

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• Towards a theory of domination in graphs
• Imitative Behavior in a Two-Population Model
• The Logic of Animal Conflict

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