Cost optimisation of individual-based institutional reward incentives for promoting cooperation in finite populations

DOI10.1007/S11538-024-01344-7zbMATH Open1544.9213MaRDI QIDQ6597996

C. M. Durbac, The Anh Han, Manh Hong Duong

Publication date: 4 September 2024

Published in: Bulletin of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

population dynamicsevolutionary game theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
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• Analytical inversion of general tridiagonal matrices
• Evolution of fairness in the one-shot anonymous Ultimatum Game
• The Calculus of Selfishness
• Cost optimisation of hybrid institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in finite populations
• Evolution of commitment in the spatial public goods game through institutional incentives

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