Evolution of commitment in the spatial public goods game through institutional incentives

DOI10.1016/j.amc.2024.128646zbMATH Open1545.91138MaRDI QIDQ6585484

The Anh Han, Lucas S. Flores

Publication date: 12 August 2024

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Public goods (91B18) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Commitment to cooperation and peer punishment: its evolution
• Symbiotic behaviour in the public goods game with altruistic punishment
• Effects of interconnections among corruption, institutional punishment, and economic factors on the evolution of cooperation
• Involution game with spatio-temporal heterogeneity of social resources
• A review of theoretical studies on indirect reciprocity
• Statistical physics of human cooperation
• The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas
• Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
• Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
• Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Cost optimisation of hybrid institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in finite populations
• An evolutionary game with revengers and sufferers on complex networks

Related Items (1)

Cost optimisation of individual-based institutional reward incentives for promoting cooperation in finite populations

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