Reputation-based persuasion platforms
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Publication:6634111
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.07.002MaRDI QIDQ6634111
Itai Arieli, Moshe Tennenholtz, Omer Madmon
Publication date: 6 November 2024
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- Reputation and imperfect information
- Optimal dynamic information provision
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Recommender Systems as Mechanisms for Social Learning*
- Sequential persuasion
- Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
- Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
- Bad reputation with simple rating systems
- Learning from reviews: the selection effect and the speed of learning
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