How do voters respond to welfare vis-à-vis public good programs? Theory and evidence of political clientelism

DOI10.3982/QE2315MaRDI QIDQ6646152

Sandip Mitra, Dilip Mookherjee, Pranab Bardhan, Anusha Nath

Publication date: 29 November 2024

Published in: Quantitative Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

votingpublic goodswelfare programsclientelism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites Work

• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
• Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India
• How do voters respond to welfare vis-à-vis public good programs? Theory and evidence of political clientelism

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