Moral hazard, the Savage framework, and state-dependent utility
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Publication:6652856
DOI10.1007/S10670-019-00108-3WikidataQ128216700 ScholiaQ128216700MaRDI QIDQ6652856
Publication date: 13 December 2024
Published in: Erkenntnis (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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