Optimal forward contract design in a supply chain with asymmetric cost information

DOI10.1051/RO/2024209MaRDI QIDQ6667335

Yuanyuan Luo

Publication date: 20 January 2025

Published in: RAIRO. Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

forward contractprincipal-agent theoryasymmetric cost informationimperfect B2B spot markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80)

Cites Work

• Outsource planning through option contracts with demand and cost uncertainty
• Selection of contract suppliers under price and demand uncertainty in a dynamic market
• Optimal bidding and contracting strategies for capital-intensive goods
• Integrated demand and procurement portfolio management with spot market volatility and option contracts
• Supply option contracts with spot market and demand information updating
• Optimal ordering and pricing strategies in the presence of a B2B spot market
• Manufacturer encroachment with quality decision under asymmetric demand information
• Contracting with asymmetric cost information in a dual-channel supply chain
• Contracting to Assure Supply: How to Share Demand Forecasts in a Supply Chain
• Equilibrium Forward Contracts on Nonstorable Commodities in the Presence of Market Power
• Monitoring strategies of enterprise’s emission reduction with asymmetric information
• Impact of quality decisions on information sharing with supplier encroachment
• Demand information sharing in a contract farming supply chain

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