Experimentation and approval mechanisms

DOI10.3982/ECTA17021zbMATH Open1541.91061MaRDI QIDQ6536466

Andrew McClellan

Publication date: 13 May 2024

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

experimentationdynamic mechanism designapproval rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
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• Optimal stopping with private information
• A duality approach to problems of combined stopping and deciding under constraints
• A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
• Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
• A Theory of Wage Dynamics
• Optimal Contracts for Experimentation
• Optimal Monitoring Design
• Optimal Stopping Rules
• The Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements
• Experimentation and approval mechanisms

Related Items (2)

Experimentation and approval mechanisms ⋮ Testing under information manipulation

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