Testing under information manipulation

DOI10.1007/S00199-023-01514-ZzbMATH Open1544.91189MaRDI QIDQ6559108

Silvia Martinez-Gorricho, Carlos Oyarzun

Publication date: 21 June 2024

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardcommitmentinformation manipulationharsh standardssoft standardsstandard of evidence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Mechanism design theory (91B03) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Noisy signaling: theory and experiment
• Monopoly and product quality
• Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion
• Resisting persuasion
• Persuasion with costly precision
• Hidden testing and selective disclosure of evidence
• Mimicking, errors, and the optimal standard of proof
• On the problem of the most efficient tests of statistical hypotheses.
• Subjective Performance and the Value of Blind Evaluation
• The Theory of Decision Procedures for Distributions with Monotone Likelihood Ratio
• Mechanisms With Evidence: Commitment and Robustness
• Strategic Sample Selection
• Test Design Under Falsification
• Experimentation and approval mechanisms

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