Relational contracts: public versus private savings
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Publication:6536569
DOI10.3982/ECTA18742zbMATH Open1541.91137MaRDI QIDQ6536569
Daniel F. Garrett, Francesc Dilmé
Publication date: 13 May 2024
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- Unemployment insurance with hidden savings
- On the first-order approach in principal-agent models with hidden borrowing and lending
- Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
- A solvable continuous time dynamic principal-agent model
- Efficient allocations with hidden income and hidden storage
- Repeated Moral Hazard
- Foreign Direct Investment and the Risk of Expropriation
- Efficient Risk Sharing with Limited Commitment and Storage
- The Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements
- International Business Cycles with Endogenous Incomplete Markets
- Optimal Asset Management Contracts With Hidden Savings
- Relational contracts: public versus private savings
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