Efficiency-inducing policy for polluting oligopolists
DOI10.1007/S13235-023-00534-7zbMATH Open1537.91158MaRDI QIDQ6548530
Guiomar Martín-Herrán, S. J. Rubio
Publication date: 1 June 2024
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
differential gamesoligopolyCournot competitionstock pollutantabatementhomogeneous goodabatement subsidiesproduction tax
Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Cites Work
- Environmental policy and stable collusion: the case of a dynamic polluting oligopoly
- Taxes versus quantities for a stock pollutant with endogenous abatement costs and asymmetric information
- Capital-accumulation games under environmental regulation and duopolistic competition
- On the multiplicity of efficiency-inducing tax rules
- On coincidence of feedback and global Stackelberg equilibria in a class of differential games
- Dynamic game of international pollution control with general oligopolistic equilibrium: Neary meets Dockner and Long
- Global environment and dynamic games of environmental policy in an international duopoly
- Optimal taxation in a common resource oligopoly game
- Managing the tragedy of commons and polluting emissions: a unified view
- Pollution control and the dynamics of the firm: The effects of market-based instruments on optimal firm investments
- Environmental policy instruments in an international duopoly with feedback investment strategies.
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