Subsidies and pricing strategies in a vehicle scrappage program with strategic consumers
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Publication:6558659
DOI10.1007/S10100-023-00867-ZMaRDI QIDQ6558659
Publication date: 20 June 2024
Published in: CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- Qualifying for a government's scrappage program to stimulate consumers' trade-in transactions? Analysis of an automobile supply chain involving a manufacturer and a retailer
- Simulating resistances in innovation diffusion over multiple generations: an agent-based approach for fuel-cell vehicles
- A quantitative model of accelerated vehicle-retirement induced by subsidy
- Strategic price subsidies for new technologies
- Price subsidies and guaranteed buys of a new technology
- Optimal government scrappage subsidies in the presence of strategic consumers
- Effectiveness of carbon pricing policies for promoting urban freight electrification: analysis of last mile delivery in Madrid
- Games and dynamic games
- Optimal Price Skimming by a Monopolist Facing Rational Consumers
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