The dynamics of casual groups can keep free-riders at bay
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Publication:6566667
DOI10.1016/J.MBS.2024.109188zbMATH Open1545.91041MaRDI QIDQ6566667
Mauro Santos, José F. Fontanari
Publication date: 3 July 2024
Published in: Mathematical Biosciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
replicator equationevolution of cooperationpublic goods games\(N\)-person snowdrift gamecasual groups
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