On Nash-solvability of \(n\)-person graphical games under Markov and a-priori realizations

Cites Work

Title not available (Why is that?)
Title not available (Why is that?)
Title not available (Why is that?)
Title not available (Why is that?)
Title not available (Why is that?)
Title not available (Why is that?)
On Nash equilibria and improvement cycles in pure positional strategies for chess-like and backgammon-like \(n\)-person games
Chess-like games may have no uniform Nash equilibria even in mixed strategies
A nested family of \(k\)-total effective rewards for positional games
Semi-Markov strategies in stochastic games
Nash-solvable two-person symmetric cycle game forms
On acyclicity of games with cycles
Pure subgame-perfect equilibria in free transition games
The bad match; a total reward stochastic game
Positional strategies for mean payoff games
Perfect information stochastic games and related classes
On Nash-solvability in pure stationary strategies of finite games with perfect information which may have cycles.
A three-person deterministic graphical game without Nash equilibria
Monotone bargaining is Nash-solvable
Deterministic graphical games
On Nash-solvability in pure stationary strategies of the deterministic \(n\)-person games with perfect information and mean or total effective cost
Non-cooperative games
A theorem on the existence of equilibrium situations in pure stationary strategies for ergodic extensions of (2×k)-bimatrix games
Cyclic games and an algorithm to find minimax cycle means in directed graphs
The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
A stochastic game with complete information and without equilibrium situations in pure stationary strategies
The solvability of positional games in pure strategies
Backward induction in presence of cycles
Deciding parity games in quasipolynomial time
Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2004
Discrete Dynamic Programming
Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games
Stochastic Games with Perfect Information and Time Average Payoff
Bottleneck extrema
Equilibrium points in n -person games
A Theory of N -Person Games with Perfect Information
Stochastic Games
Computing lexicographically safe Nash equilibria in finite two-person games with tight game forms given by oracles
Lexicographically maximal edges of dual hypergraphs and Nash-solvability of tight game forms

This page was built for publication: On Nash-solvability of \(n\)-person graphical games under Markov and a-priori realizations

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6573335)