Repeated prisoner's dilemma games in multi-player structured populations with crosstalk
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6585488
DOI10.1016/j.amc.2024.128650zbMATH Open1545.91058MaRDI QIDQ6585488
Xinyue Chen, Ji Quan, Xianjia Wang
Publication date: 12 August 2024
Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- How mutation affects evolutionary games on graphs
- Noise-induced enhancement of network reciprocity in social dilemmas
- Learning to cooperate with Pavlov and adaptive strategy for the iterated prisoner's dilemma with noise
- Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with individual disguise and peer punishment
- Noise-induced sustainability of cooperation in Prisoner's dilemma game
- Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the public goods game with pool exclusion strategies
- Environmental policy regulation and corporate compliance in evolutionary game models with well-mixed and structured populations
- Statistical physics of human cooperation
- Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma
- Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
- Multimarket contact, imperfect monitoring, and implicit collusion
This page was built for publication: Repeated prisoner's dilemma games in multi-player structured populations with crosstalk
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6585488)
