Time-consistent implementation in macroeconomic games
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Publication:6631807
DOI10.3982/TE5866MaRDI QIDQ6631807
Publication date: 1 November 2024
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- The time inconsistency of delegation-based time inconsistency solutions in monetary policy
- Credible public policy
- Fiscal policy under loose commitment
- Expectation traps and discretion
- Bubble-free policy feedback rules
- Equilibrium and government commitment
- Tax Riots
- Expectation Traps and Monetary Policy
- Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory*
- Non-linear Capital Taxation Without Commitment
- Bailouts and Financial Fragility
- Balance Sheet Effects, Bailout Guarantees and Financial Crises
- Monetary Discretion, Pricing Complementarity, and Dynamic Multiple Equilibria
- Rules without Commitment: Reputation and Incentives
- Fiscal Rules as Bargaining Chips
- Sophisticated Monetary Policies*
- Fiscal rules and discretion under limited enforcement
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