Allocation rules are very generally vulnerable to the strategic withholding of endowments
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Publication:6665437
DOI10.1007/S00182-024-00897-0MaRDI QIDQ6665437
Publication date: 17 January 2025
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
homothetic preferenceswithholding-proofnessEgalitarian-equivalence in tradesindividual-endowments lower boundsno-envy in trades
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