Norms and the evolution of leaders' followership
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Publication:6665672
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.09.006MaRDI QIDQ6665672
Publication date: 17 January 2025
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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- History, Expectations, and Leadership in the Evolution of Social Norms
- How do you defend a network?
- Reaching a Consensus
- Contagion
- Targeting Interventions in Networks
- Optimizing Opinions with Stubborn Agents
- A model for spatial conflict
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- The Evolution of Conventions
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