Truthfulness Flooded Domains and the Power of Verification for Mechanism Design

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_17zbMATH Open1406.91116OpenAlexW2178042587MaRDI QIDQ2937758

Emmanouil Zampetakis, Dimitris Fotakis

Publication date: 12 January 2015

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_17

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designsocial choice functiontruthfulnesssymmetric verification

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

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