Mechanism design in fair sequencing

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-39344-0_14MaRDI QIDQ6535814

Ling-Fei Yu, Zhou Chen, Qi Qi, Yiming Ding

Publication date: 28 February 2024

zbMATH Keywords

egalitarianbudget-balanceDSICsequence positions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
• A simple budget-balanced mechanism
• Implementing egalitarian-equivalent allocation of indivisible goods on restricted domains
• Egalitarianism under earmark constraints
• A crash course in implementation theory
• Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
• Implementing Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations
• Incentives in Teams

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