Dynamic information provision: rewarding the past and guiding the future

DOI10.3982/ECTA17345zbMATH Open1541.91147MaRDI QIDQ6536577

Ian Ball

Publication date: 13 May 2024

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

delayed reportingdynamic information design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Dynamic persuasion
• Optimal dynamic information provision
• Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies
• A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
• A Theory of Wage Dynamics
• Foreign Direct Investment and the Risk of Expropriation
• Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
• Continuous Time Repeated Games
• The Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements
• Paying with information

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