Contracting over persistent information

DOI10.3982/TE5056MaRDI QIDQ6565786

Tristan Tomala, Wei Zhao, Claudio Mezzetti, Ludovic Renou

Publication date: 2 July 2024

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

dynamicinformationcontractsenderpersuasiondisclosurereceiverrevelation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites Work

• Optimal dynamic information provision
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Slow persuasion
• Information design in multistage games
• Dynamic information provision: rewarding the past and guiding the future

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