Maximize liquid welfare in combinatorial auctions with monotone valuations

DOI10.1142/S0217595923400109zbMATH Open1542.91094MaRDI QIDQ6542876

Wenjing Liu, Yuanyuan Wang, Qingqin Nong, Jiwen Chen

Publication date: 23 May 2024

Published in: Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

approximationcombinatorial auctiontruthfulbudget feasible

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Liquid welfare maximization in auctions with multiple items
• Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
• Online Mechanism Design (Randomized Rounding on the Fly)
• Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders
• Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions
• Breaking the Logarithmic Barrier for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders
• Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets
• Probability Inequalities for Sums of Bounded Random Variables
• Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
• Online random sampling for budgeted settings

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