Disbandment rules that most facilitate the evolution of cooperation

DOI10.1016/J.TPB.2023.08.004MaRDI QIDQ6546670

Shun Kurokawa

Publication date: 30 May 2024

Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationevolutionary game theory\(n\)-player gameopting out

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Biology and other natural sciences (92-XX)

Cites Work

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• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors
• The option to leave: conditional dissociation in the evolution of cooperation
• Leave and let leave: a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation
• Effect of the group size on the evolution of cooperation when an exit option is present
• Know when to walk away: contingent movement and the evolution of cooperation
• Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option
• A simple rule of direct reciprocity leads to the stable coexistence of cooperation and defection in the prisoner's dilemma game
• Disbandment rule sways the evolution of tolerance
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• The Calculus of Selfishness

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