Value of screening in procurement mechanism: an experimental study

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2023.08.049MaRDI QIDQ6555183

Jinxing Xie, Zewu Jiang, Y. Zhang, Xiaobo Zhao, Wanshan Zhu

Publication date: 14 June 2024

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

fairnesssupply chain managementmechanism designscreeningbehavioural or

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90Bxx)

Cites Work

• Reference points in revenue sharing contracts -- how to design optimal supply chain contracts
• Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory
• Supplier-buyer contracting: Asymmetric cost information and cutoff level policy for buyer participation
• Designing Supply Contracts: Contract Type and Information Asymmetry
• Measuring Inequity Aversion in a Heterogeneous Population Using Experimental Decisions and Subjective Probabilities
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study

This page was built for publication: Value of screening in procurement mechanism: an experimental study

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6555183)