Licensing of a new technology by an outside and uninformed licensor

DOI10.1007/S00712-024-00860-3zbMATH Open1545.91163MaRDI QIDQ6577543

Manel Antelo, Antonio Sampayo

Publication date: 24 July 2024

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationwelfarescreeningnew technologyper-unit royaltyad-valorem royaltyexclusive and non-exclusive licensing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

• Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation
• Monopoly and product quality
• On monopolistic licensing strategies under asymmetric information
• Welfare reducing vertical licensing in the presence of complementary inputs
• Optimal licensing under incomplete information: the case of the inside patent holder
• General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
• More licensed technologies may make it worse: a welfare analysis of licensing vertically two-tier foreign technologies

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