Efficient equilibria in common interest voting games

DOI10.1007/S00182-024-00886-3zbMATH Open1544.91125MaRDI QIDQ6581885

Vasileios Vlaseros, Kohei Kawamura

Publication date: 1 August 2024

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

private informationasymmetric equilibriastrategic votingpublic informationcommittee decision making

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Herding with collective preferences
• Deliberative voting
• Do Shareholders Vote Strategically? Voting Behavior, Proposal Screening, and Majority Rules*
• Condorcet meets Ellsberg

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